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COMMENTS
THE ELDERLY INCOMPETENT: THE RIGHT TO DIE
WITH DIGNITY
INTRODUCTION
"It hath been said, that it is not death, but dying, which is
terrible."'
Until eight months ago, Mary Smith's daily schedule included
spoon-feeding her husband, Edward, 87, who has Alzheimer's dis-
ease. Edward also suffers from heart disease, hypertension, bed-
sores, and a gangrenous left leg. His legs are contracted into a
semi-fetal position, and he cannot speak or control his bodily func-
tions. He is, however, minimally aware of his surroundings. When
his condition deteriorated and Edward began losing weight, his
$3,000 per month nursing home began feeding him through a naso-
gastric tube.
Based on various discussions the two had throughout their
marriage, Mary feels certain that Edward would not tolerate such
an invasion if he were competent. She also believes that the feed-
ing tube causes Edward a great deal of pain. However, Mary is
confused about what, if any, choices she may have with regard to
terminating Edward's treatment. The state's natural death act,
which allows qualified patients to terminate artificial life-sus-
taining treatment in certain cases, does not apply to Edward. Un-
fortunately, he never took the time to execute the required living
will stating his desire for a natural death. Furthermore, even if Ed-
ward had executed such a document, its utility would be question-
able in his case for two reasons. First, the state's act requires pa-
tients from whom treatment is terminated to be diagnosed as
suffering from a terminal illness, yet Edward may live for many
1. H. FIELDING, AMELIA, bk. iii, ch. 4, reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS (2d ed. 1953).
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more months. Second, the statute is silent as to whether a feeding
tube is a type of medical treatment that may be withheld or with-
drawn, and the courts in Edward's state have never addressed the
issue. Edward's doctor, who visits him once per month in the nurs-
ing home, refuses to withdraw Edward's feeding tube because Ed-
ward is not brain dead, comatose or in a persistent vegetative
state. Although initially horrified at the request, Mary now won-
ders whether she should have complied when Edward asked her to
help him end his life three years ago.
Mary and Edward Smith's dilemma, though disturbing, is not
uncommon. Medical technology now makes it possible to prolong
the dying process of severely debilitated elderly patients for
months and even years. As academic commentators have observed,
a prolonged death has severe detrimental effects not only on the
patient, but on third parties as well.2 The expense of years of hos-
pital or nursing home care and treatment of a dying patient can
burden a family and strain public resources.3 Further, the emo-
tional suffering to which a family is subjected during a loved one's
lingering, painful death can be devastating.'
This Comment will address the right to withdraw nutrition
and hydration from the growing number of elderly incompetent
patients who are dying, but who retain some minimal level of con-
sciousness. Part I will discuss the legal bases for the right to refuse
medical treatment. It will note the state interests that are contrary
to this right, and will review important judicial decisions which
have addressed an incompetent individual's right to have life-sus-
taining treatment withdrawn. Part II will discuss state legislatures'
responses to this delicate issue. Part III will focus specifically on
the withdrawal of feeding tubes from elderly incompetent, but con-
scious, patients with severe and permanent mental and physical
impairments and a limited life expectancy. Part III will recom-
mend that courts, in determining whether such patients have a
right to die, adopt a standard which characterizes artificial nutri-
tion and hydration as a type of life-sustaining medical treatment
which may be terminated. The standard adopted should be one
which also gives determinative weight to the wishes of the patient
or, alternatively, the patient's best interests.'
2. Merritt, Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REV. 692 (1987).
3. Id. at 692.
4. Id.
5. This standard is adapted from a decision of the New Jersey Supreme
[Vol. 13:57
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RIGHT To DIE
I THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. The Common Law Basis
The United States Supreme Court recognized an individual's
right to bodily integrity nearly 100 years ago in Union Pacific Ry.
v. Botsford.' The Court upheld a personal injury plaintiff's right to
refuse to submit to a medical exam, stating that "[n]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law."'
This right to bodily integrity provides the basis for the com-
mon law tort doctrine of informed consent.' Informed consent re-
quires a physician to give sufficient information to a patient so
that he understands his condition, prognosis, and the risks and
benefits of alternatives, including no treatment.9 The doctrine
arose in recognition of the value society places on a person's auton-
omy and as the primary vehicle by which a person can protect the
integrity of his body.10
If one can consent to treatment, it follows that one can also
refuse it." Thus, as a necessary corollary to informed consent, the
right to refuse treatment arose." In recent years, many courts have
allowed persons to terminate or withhold life-sustaining treatment
based on this common law right.13
Court, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), discussed extensively in
Part III, infra p. 13.
6. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
7. Id. at 251.
8. See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treat-
ment: Bodily Integrity Versus The Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228,
236-38 (1973).
9. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914).
10. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988)(en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990).
11. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)(court allowed
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from incompetent, severely debilitated
elderly nursing home patient); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987)(court allowed removal of feeding tube from 65-year-old woman in persis-
tent vegetative state); In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292
1990]
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For example, in 1981, the New York Court of Appeals found
the doctrine of informed consent sufficient to warrant termination
of life-sustaining treatment in In re Eichner.4 Brother Joseph
Fox, a member of the Society of Mary, suffered cardiac arrest dur-
ing. an operation which resulted in severe brain damage and his
inability to breath without a respirator.'" Fox, a high school
teacher, had previously expressed to his students during a formal
discussion his desire to have nothing extraordinary done to keep
him alive.' 6 The court found his common law right to refuse treat-
ment controlling under the circumstances, given the clear and con-
vincing evidence of Fox's desire to forego extraordinary medical
treatment.17
Other courts have employed a similar rationale in permitting
the withdrawal of treatment from incompetent patients. Reasoning
that incompetent individuals retain the same rights as those who
are competent, many courts have adopted a substituted judgment
standard which requires the court to determine what the incompe-
tent individual's decision would have been under the circum-
stances.18 Still other courts allow a surrogate decisionmaker, usu-
ally a family member, to exercise the right for the incompetent
patient.19
(1989)(court allowed discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration from in-
competent 76-year-old woman).
14. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 38 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981). In the companion case to Eichner, the court reached a different
conclusion. There, the mother of a 52-year-old man suffering from bladder cancer
who had been severely retarded for most of his life sought to terminate the pa-
tient's required blood transfusions. The court refused, reasoning that the patient's
life-long incompetency made it unrealistic to attempt to determine whether the
patient himself would want to continue the treatment if competent. In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 380, 420 N.E.2d 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1981). But see Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977)(relying on both the right of privacy and the right to informed consent to
permit the withholding of chemotherapy from a severely retarded 67-year-old
man with leukemia).
15. Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
16. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
17. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
18. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)(court permitted withholding of chemotherapy
from 67-year-old retarded man suffering from leukemia).
19. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987)(court held that
family or close friends are entitled to make a substituted judgment for 31-year-old
patient in persistent vegetative state regarding patient's desire to have treatment
[Vol. 13:57
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RIGHT To DIE
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
The common law doctrine of informed consent is a strong ba-
sis for the right to refuse medical treatment. However, some courts
addressing the issue have relied on the constitutional right of pri-
vacy to determine that a mechanically maintained incompetent in-
dividual has the right to terminate life-sustaining procedures.2"
While some of these courts have based the right on state constitu-
tions, most have relied on the United States Constitution and the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.2
The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first to apply a con-
stitutional right of privacy to a decision to terminate life-sus-
taining treatment. 22 In In re Quinlan, Karen Quinlan suffered se-
vere brain damage as a result of anoxia, and thereafter was kept
alive by a respirator and a feeding tube.2 3 Her father sought judi-
cial permission to disconnect the respirator. 24 Because Karen was
terminal and in a persistent vegetative state, the court found a
right of privacy in Karen Quinlan to terminate her life.25 According
to the court, the state's interest in preserving life weakens and
"the. individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily in-
vasion increases and the prognosis dims. '26
The court acknowledged that since Karen was incompetent,
she could not indicate whether she would want the treatment con-
tinued, nor had she ever expressed prior to her illness any desire to
forego life-sustaining treatment.27 However, the court found that
the only way to preserve Karen's privacy right was to permit her
terminated, even though evidence insufficient to meet clear and convincing stan-
dard). But see In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531
N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1980)(rejecting substituted judgment approach be-
cause "no person or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an
acceptable quality of life for another" Id.).
20. Comment, The Foundations of the Right To Die, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 235,
241 (1987).
21. Id. at 241. It appears that this reliance was misplaced. See infra note 49
and accompanying text. However, the Court has expressly applied a privacy right
to contraceptive use and abortion. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 479 (1973).
22. In re Quinlin, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nor.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
23. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 23, 355 A.2d at 651.
24. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 651.
25. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
26. Id.
27. Id.
1990]
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guardian and family to decide whether Karen would have decided
to forego such treatment.28 Since Quinlan, courts addressing the
right to terminate the life-prolonging medical treatment of incom-
petent patients have based a right to refuse treatment either on a
constitutional right of privacy, the common law right- to informed
consent, or on a combination of the two. 9
C. The State's Interests
A constitutional right to refuse treatment, though widely ac-
cepted, is not absolute.30 The right must be balanced against the
state's interests to the contrary.31 The four state interests com-
monly identified as being adverse to the right to die are preserving
life, preventing suicide, protecting the ethical integrity of the med-
ical profession, and protecting the interests of innocent third
parties.32
28. Id.
29. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 1365 (2d ed. 1988).
Twenty-six jurisdictions have authorized the termination of life-sustaining treat-
ment in a variety of circumstances since Quinlan. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Flem-
ing, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App.
3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 399
(1988); In re Rodas, No. 86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa County Jan. 22, 1987);
McConnell v. Beverly Enters., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); In re Severns,
425 A.2d 156 (Del. 1980); Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp.
1452 (D.D.C. 1985); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.
2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); Wilcox v.
Hawaii, Civ. No. 860116 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 5th Cir. June 16, 1986); Morgan v. Olds,
417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); In re PVW, 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In
re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Culham, No. 87-340537-AZ (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Oakand County Dec. 15, 1987); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re
Bayer, No. 131 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct. Dec. 11, 1987); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1 (1980); Evans v. District Attorney, No. E82-2173
(Ore. Cir. Ct. Douglas County Dec. 13, 1982); In re Jane Doe, 16 Phila. 229 (Pa. C.
Com. P1. 1987); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Guardian-
ship Estate of Peterson, No. E117,982 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jefferson County Aug. 4,
1983); Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. Ct. Op. 414 (Aspen
1987)(Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County 1986); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash.
2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), modified 757 P.2d 534 (1988); In re Guardianship of
Welch, No. 89GN30 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Eau Claire County June 21, 1989).
30. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988)(en banc).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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The state's interest in preserving life embraces an interest in
prolonging the life of the individual patient and an interest in the
sanctity of life itself.3" However, this interest usually does not
overcome the patient's right to terminate treatment. While the in-
terest in preserving life is great when an affliction is curable, it
weakens where medical treatment only prolongs the life of a pa-
tient whose death would soon occur regardless of any medical
treatment. 4 In such cases, "the issue is not whether, but when, for
how long, and at what cost to the individual a life may be briefly
extended.35
Prevention of suicide, .the second state interest identified, is
often thought of as being included within the broader state inter-
est in preserving life.36 Courts have had little trouble rejecting the
argument that exercising the right to terminate .life-sustaining
treatment is the equivalent of committing suicide. For example,
the Quinlan court carefully distinguished an act of self-destruction
from one of self-determination.37 Other courts have widely engaged
in a similar analysis, finding that a patient who chooses to have
medical treatment withdrawn does not necessarily have a specific
intent to die. 8
The third interest, that of protecting the ethical integrity of
the medical profession, has not barred any court from allowing ter-
mination of medical treatment.3 9 The medical community has rec-
ognized that the development of advanced life support techniques
complicates the physician's obligation to make every conceivable
effort to prolong life.40 Accordingly, the medical profession ac-
knowledges the necessity of striking a balance between the goals of
maintaining biological life and relieving a patient's suffering.4
Finally, the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties
is implicated when the patient's decision could adversely affect the
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986)).
35. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
36. Comment, supra note 20, at 261.
37. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 43, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School, 373 Mass. at 743
n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
39. Comment, supra note 20, at 262.
40. Merritt, supra note 2, at 722.
41. Id.
1990]
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health, safety, or security of others.42 Right to die cases rarely in-
volve this issue because the majority of the patients who are in-
volved in decisions to terminate treatment are elderly, with no mi-
nor children or other dependents.4 3 The patient's spouse, children
or nearest relative is usually the party petitioning for termination
of the life-sustaining treatment. Rather than adversely affecting
these third parties, withdrawing treatment arguably benefits the
patient's family by alleviating the emotional suffering and financial
burden caused by the prolonged death of their loved one."
D. The Cruzan Decision
As previously noted, many courts after Quinlan which permit-
ted the withdrawal from an incompetent patient of mechanical
means of life support, based their decisions either partially or en-
tirely on a constitutional right of privacy.4 1 Until recently, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court had never squarely faced
the issue of whether the right of privacy extends to a decision to
refuse medical treatment.46 In June of 1990, the Supreme Court in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health4 7 indicated that it
does not.
The Cruzan Court held that the United States Constitution
does not prohibit a state from requiring that an incompetent per-
son's wishes as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. 8 In so holding, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and
Kennedy, stated that "although many state courts have held that a
right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitu-
tional right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue
is more properly analyzed in terms of a fourteenth amendment lib-
42. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 353, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985).
43. Merritt, supra note 2, at 723.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. The Supreme Court's last privacy decision before Cruzan, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), emphasized that the scope of the right of privacy
is limited. There, the Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. The
Court found that prior precedent did not justify a finding that homosexual sod-
omy is constitutionally protected because prior privacy decisions had been limited
to issues dealing with the family, marriage or procreation. Bowers, 478 U.S. at
194.
47. __ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
48. Id. at 2854.
[Vol. 13:57
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erty interest."49 The Court emphasized that state courts are able to
rely on state constitutions, the common law and state statutes for
guidance in determining whether an incompetent individual may
refuse medical treatment. ° It then noted that these sources are
not available to the United States Supreme Court where the ques-
tion is simply whether the United States Constitution prohibits a
state - in this case, Missouri - from choosing a particular rule of
law."
In choosing its rule, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a
state trial court's decision authorizing the termination of nutrition
and hydration from Nancy Cruzan, a thirty-two year old woman
who sustained severe injuries in a 1983 automobile accident which
rendered her incompetent 2 She remains in a Missouri state hospi-
tal in a persistent vegetative state. 3 The trial court found that a
person in Cruzan's position has a fundamental right under the
state and federal constitutions to refuse life-sustaining treatment.54
The trial court also concluded that Cruzan's conversation with a
former housemate suggested that she would not want to continue
with her nutrition and hydration. 5 The Missouri Supreme Court,
however, read no such privacy right into either the state or federal
constitutions. 5 Furthermore, although the court recognized a com-
mon law right to refuse treatment, it questioned its applicability in
Nancy Cruzan's case." The court decided that Missouri's living
will statute embodied a policy strongly favoring the preservation of
life, and that Cruzan's statements to her housemate were "unrelia-
ble for the purpose of determining her intent."58 It concluded that
no person, including the patient's parents, can assume the choice
for an incompetent individual in the absence of a living will or
49. Id. at 2851 n.7.
50. Id. at 2851.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2846.
53. Id. at 2845. The Court described the term ."persistent vegetative state" as
"a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications
of significant cognitive function." Id. Medical experts testified at the Missouri
trial that Nancy Cruzan could live for another thirty years in this condition. Id.
54. Id. at 2846.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc)).
1990]
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clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes. 9
In upholding the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, the
United States Supreme Court stated that it could be assumed that
a competent person would have a constitutionally protected right
under the Due Process Clause to refuse lifesaving nutrition and
hydration."0 However the Court emphasized that this does not
mean that an incompetent person should possess the same right."
The Court also held that, in light of the particularly important in-
dividual interests at stake, a state may apply a clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard in determining whether a surrogate may act
for the patient in electing to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.62
Here, according to the Court, the Missouri Supreme Court did not
err by concluding that such evidence was lacking. 3 Finally, the
Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require a state to
accept the family member's substituted judgment absent substan-
tial proof that their views reflect those of the patient's.4
In sum, the long-awaited Supreme Court decision allows a
state, if it chooses, to substantially restrict an incompetent individ-
ual's right to have life-sustaining medical intervention terminated,
even where some evidence exists that the patient would not want
to continue with the treatment. In an emotional dissent, Justice
Brennan described Nancy Cruzan as dwelling in a "twilight zone of
suspended animation where death commences while life, in some
form, continues."6'5 Justice Brennan stated that Cruzan is entitled
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2852.
61. Id. The Court had difficulty with the Cruzans' assertion that an incompe-
tent person should possess the same Due Process right to refuse lifesaving treat-
ment as is possessed by a competent person. The Court stated that the difficulty
with such a claim is that "in a sense it begs the question: an incompetent person
is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical
right to refuse treatment or any other right." Id. The Court then stated that such
a right must be exercised for the incompetent person, if at all, by some sort of
surrogate, and that the establishment by a state of a procedural safeguard to as-
sure the action of the surrogate conforms to the expressed wishes of the patient is
not prohibited by the United States Constitution. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2855. The testimony presented at the trial consisted primarily of
Nancy Cruzan's statements to her housemate that she would not want to live as a
"vegetable," but did not include any observations expressly dealing with the with-
drawal of life-sustaining medical treatment. Id.
64. Id. at 2856.
65. Id. at 2863 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154
Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987)(en banc)).
[Vol. 13:57
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol13/iss1/2
RIGHT To DIE
to choose to die with dignity. 66 He characterized the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard imposed by the Missouri Supreme Court
as an "improperly biased procedural obstacle" which im-
permissably burdens an individual's fundamental right to be free
of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration. 7
THE NATURAL DEATH ACTS
Courts which have addressed the right to terminate treatment
have consistently determined that the key to resolving the ques-
tion is to ascertain the patient's wishes .6 This standard prevails,
although the required degree of proof of the patient's desires varies
among the jurisdictions. Since the courts consider the patient's
choice to be crucial, it is problematic that the patient is nearly al-
ways incompetent when the decision to continue or terminate
treatment must be made.
State legislatures have responded to this dilemma. Currently,
the overwhelming majority of states have adopted some form of a
natural death act which, in certain circumstances, allows the with-
holding or termination of mechanical or artificial means used to
prolong a patient's life. 9 While the acts are not identical, most
contain similar provisions.70 North Carolina's natural death act71
provides that extraordinary means 72 may be withheld or discontin-
ued by the physician if two conditions are satisfied. First, the pa-
66. Id. at 2864.
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
69. States with natural death acts are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra
notes 78-81 for full citations.
70. The basic provisions found in most of the acts are: a set of definitions, a
procedure for executing and revoking a living will (many statutes include a form
designed to meet the act's requirements), and immunity for health care providers.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1985).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(2) (1985) defines "extraordinary means" as
"any medical procedure or intervention which in the judgment of the attending
physician would serve only to postpone artificially the moment of death by sus-
taining, restoring, or supplanting a vital function." The act is silent as to whether
artificial nutrition and hydration is included in the definition of "extraordinary
means."
1990]
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tient must have signed a declaration of a desire for a natural death
(commonly referred to as a living Will). 73 Second, the patient's pre-
sent condition must be terminal and incurable. 4 Meeting these
conditions qualifies the patient under the Act. North Carolina's
Act, unlike most, also provides that in the absence of such a decla-
ration, extraordinary means used to prolong the life of an incompe-
tent patient may still be terminated or withheld.75 In such cases,
the treatment may be terminated or withheld under the supervi-
sion of the attending physician and with the concurrence of the
person's spouse, guardian or a majority of the relatives of the first
degree, in that order.76 If no relative or guardian is available, the
extraordinary means may be withheld at the discretion of the at-
tending physician.77
Some of the important differences among the natural death
acts involve the statutes' definitions of "terminal" and whether
supplying food and water to the patient through a tube qualifies as
medical treatment which can be refused or withdrawn. Only six
states have adopted natural death acts which expressly include nu-
trition and hydration as a type of treatment that may be with-
drawn or withheld in certain circumstances.78 Sixteen of the natu-
ral death acts associate nutrition and hydration with the
administration of medication and procedures to provide comfort
care and alleviate pain. 9 In twelve states, the question of with-.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b) (1985).
74. Id.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Alaska Rights of Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c)
(1986); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-
103(7) (1989); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 702(d) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990); Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.03 (Supp. 1990); Oregon Rights With Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.580 (1989); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-11-103(5) (Supp. 1990).
79. Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); Arizona
Medical Treatment Decision Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4) (1986); Ar-
kansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT. §
20-17-206(b) (Supp. 1989); California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1990); Florida Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (1986); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 327D-2 (Supp. 1988); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Pro-
cedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (West 1990); Iowa Life Sustaining Proce-
dures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(5) (West 1989); Maryland Life-Sustaining
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drawing nutrition and hydration is not addressed by the language
of the statute; thus the matter is left for judicial interpretation."
Six natural death acts expressly exclude nutrition and hydration
from the definition of life-sustaining medical treatment which may
be terminated."'
Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. § 5-605 (1990); Montana Living
Will Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2) (Supp. 1990); New Hampshire Terminal
Care Document Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:21I (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma
Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(4) (West Supp. 1990); South
Carolina Death With Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(2) (Law. Co-op
Supp. 1988); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-
1103(6) (Supp. 1990); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(3)
(1985); Wyoming Act, WYo. STAT. § 35-22-101(iii) (1988). Under these acts, one
could argue that if nutrition and hydration are not needed for "comfort," the
patient should be allowed to forego such treatment.
80. Delaware Death With Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-09
(1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421
to -2430 (1989); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28 (1985); Loui-
siana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 to -.10
(West Supp. 1990); Mississippi Withdrawal of Lifesaving Mechanisms Act, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1990); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal
of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.540 to .690 (1987); New'
Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); North Carolina
Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 to -322 (1985); Texas Natu-
ral Death Act, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 672.001 to .021 (1990); Vermont
Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-62 (1987); Virginia
Natural Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988); Washington Natu-
ral Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1990). As indi-
cated, North Carolina is included in the states whose statutes are silent regarding
the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration. Therefore, until the North
Carolina courts address the question or the statute is amended, the determination
will remain with the patient's family or guardian and the physician. Of those
courts that have addressed the issue, the overwhelming majority have permitted
or would permit the termination of nutrition and hydration from incompetent
individuals. See McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn.
692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Il. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d'292
(1989); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App.
3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365,
529 A.2d 419 (1987); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Gard-
ner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
81. Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §
19a-570(1) (Supp. 1990); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)
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While natural death acts provide the means to relieve a pa-
tient's family of the burden of deciding whether to continue with
life-sustaining procedures, it must be recognized that they are nar-
rowly drawn. The acts apply only to patients who are in a terminal
condition.2 And, while the definition of terminal varies among the
statutes, many of the acts require that death be imminent or will
occur within a short period of time.8" Still other acts including
North Carolina's, do not define "terminal" at all.84
All of the natural death acts also require the execution of a
living will by the patient prior to his incompetency. 85 The absence
of such a document does not create a presumption that the patient
desired either the continuance or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro-
cedures."6 However, like North Carolina, twelve states, have en-
acted statutory surrogate decision making provisions which author-
ize certain individuals to make treatment decisions on behalf of
incompetent patients who otherwise qualify u'nder the act.87
THE ELDERLY INCOMPETENT AND THE CONROY STANDARD
Despite the general judicial and legislative acceptance of an
incompetent patient's right to terminate medical treatment, some
problems remain. First, the current body of case law addressing
the issue is limited almost exclusively to patients who are both in-
competent and either brain dead, comatose or in a persistent vege-
(1985 & Supp. 1990); Maine Living Wills Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
2921(4) (Supp. 1989); Missouri Life Support Declarations Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §
459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1990); North Dakota Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill
Act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4) (Supp. 1989); Wisconsin Natural Death Act,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5) (West 1989).
82. Comment, supra note 20, at 247.
83. Id. at 248.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a) (1985) provides a list of definitions for terms
used in the act. Definitions of "declarant," "extraordinary means," and "physi-
cian" are the only terms for which statutory definitions are provided. Section 90-
321(b) provides that if a person has declared a desire that his life not be pro-
longed by extraordinary means and it is determined by the declarant's attending
physician and one other physician that the declarant's condition is terminal and
incurable, then extraordinary means may be withheld. However, the statute in no
way attempts to define either "terminal" or "incurable."
85. See supra notes 78-81.
86. Comment, supra note 20, at 256.
87. In addition to North Carolina, the states are: Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia. See supra notes 78-81 for full citations to these statutes.
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tative state.s8 Incompetent patients who retain a minimal level of
consciousness have been the subject of few reported decisions, de-
spite the fact that patients in this category are increasingly becom-
ing involved in decisions to terminate treatment. 9 Second, the nat-
ural death acts set forth strict requirements for patients
attempting to qualify for the right to terminate life-prolonging
procedures.90 Finally, as previously noted, there remains a question
regarding whether mechanically supplied nutrition and hydration
is a type of medical treatment that may be terminated.9 1
As a result of these gaps in the law, the legal community has
overlooked a significant number of elderly incompetent patients
with regard to their right to die. 2 The following discussion will
focus on the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from elderly
incompetent patients. In particular, it will focus on patients who
have severe and permanent mental and physical impairments and
a limited life expectancy, but who remain minimally conscious.
A. The Conroy Decision
The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy93 extensively
discussed the legal, ethical and social policy implications of its de-
cision to extend the right to refuse treatment to the special class of
elderly incompetent, but conscious patients. The decision is justi-
fied, and should be followed by those courts which will face the
same question. 4
88. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)(patient in persistent vegetative
state); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990)(patient in persistent vegetative state); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987)(patient in persistent vegetative state); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529
A.2d 419 (1987)(patient in persistent vegetative state).
89. Unquestionably, the key decision addressing the ramifications of ex-
tending the right to die to this class of individuals is In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1985), discussed extensively in this Comment.
90. See supra Part II.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
92. It is estimated that there are nearly 55,000 nursing home patients receiv-
ing tube feeding at any given time, many of whom are minimally conscious. See
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLO-
GIES AND THE ELDERLY 297 (1987).
93. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
94. Courts facing this issue should not be restricted by the United States
Supreme Court's recent "right to die" opinion, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, - U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (discussed in Part I of this Coin-
1990]
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Claire Conroy, an adjudicated incompetent, was an 84-year-old
nursing home patient who suffered from numerous severe mental
and physical ailments.9 5 All of Claire's illnesses were incurable, and
her doctor had predicted that she would live for only a few
months.96 Still, Claire was marginally aware of her environment. 7
She was not brain dead, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative
state.9 8 For this reason, her doctor did not think that it would be
"acceptable medical practice" to remove the nasogastric feeding
tube that supplied her with water and nutrients.9 9 Claire's nephew,
her guardian, sought judicial permission to have the 'tube
removed. 00
The trial court granted the request, and the appellate court
reversed on two grounds.' First, the court held that the right to'
terminate life-sustaining treatment based on a guardian's substi-
tuted judgment is limited to "incurable and terminally ill patients
who are brain dead, irreversibly comatose, or vegetative.' 0 2 Sec-
ond, the court found that nutrition is not an artificial life-sus-
taining device and therefore should not be withdrawn. 0 3
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court.' The court acknowledged the distinction between vegeta-
tive patients like Karen Quinlan and those who are awake and con-
ment). The Cruzan holding was limited to setting forth the degree of proof of a
patient's wishes that a state may constitutionally require before allowing an in-
competent patient in a persistent vegetative state to "exercise" his right to refuse
nutrition and hydration. Additionally, although the Court intimated that the
right of privacy does not extend to a decision to refuse treatment, it found such a
right existed as a fourteenth amendment liberty interest. Id. at 2851. Finally, al-
though the Court did not specifically address the issue, it implied that artificial
nutrition and hydration is a type of life-prolonging treatment that may be termi-
nated in ihe appropriate circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 137-
41.
95. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 337, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217 (1985).
96. Id. at 339, 486 A.2d at 1218.
97. Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1217.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 339, 486 A.2d at 1218.
101. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983). Although Claire Conroy died with the nasogastric tube intact while
the appeal was pending, the appellate court went on to resolve the meritorious
issues in the case.
102. Id. at 466-67, 464 A.2d at 310.
103. Id. at 469-70; 464 A.2d at 311-12.
104. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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scious, like Claire." 5 It stated that the capacities of those who are
awake and conscious, while significantly diminished, are not as
limited as those of irreversibly comatose persons, and that their
deaths, while no longer distant, may not be imminent. 10 6 Neverthe-
less, the court placed those like Claire Conroy in the same category
as other incompetent patients with regard to their inability to
speak for themselves on life and death issues concerning their
medical care. 107 This inability, the court said, does not mean that
such patients lack a right to self-determination. 0 8 While the court
recognized that a federal right of privacy might apply in this case,
it instead based its decision to allow the withdrawal of Claire Con-
roy's feeding tube on the common law right to self-determination
and informed consent." 9 According to the court, a guardian can
assert an incompetent individual's right to refuse medical treat-
ment if one of three tests is satisfied: the subjective test, the lim-
ited-objective test, or the pure-objective test."0
1. The Subjective Test
Under the subjective test, life-sustaining treatment may be
withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient when it is
clear that the particular patient would have refused the treatment
under the circumstances involved.' The question is not what a
reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under the
circumstances, but what the particular patient would have done if
able to choose for himself. 2
Relevant evidence of a patient's intent not to continue life-
sustaining medical intervention includes Written documents such
as a living will or durable power of attorney," 3 oral directives given
105. Id. at 359, 486 A.2d at 1228-29.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
110. Id. at 360-67, 486 A.2d at 1229-32.
111. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d. at 1229.
112. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
113. Many states have enacted durable power of attorney statutes which spe-
cifically authorize an individual to appoint a surrogate, usually a family member
or friend, to make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the patient. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.335, 13.26.344(1) (Supp. 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2500 (West
Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp.
1989); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110.5, para. 804-1 to -12 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
58-625 (Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1989); Nev.
1990]
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to a family member, friend, or health care provider, reactions to
the treatment of others, the patient's religious beliefs, or a pattern
of the patient's conduct with regard to prior decisions about his
own medical care.' 14 "The probative value of such evidence may
vary depending on the specificity, remoteness, consistency, and
thoughtfulness of the prior statements or actions and the maturity
of the person at the time of the statements or acts. 1 5
Medical evidence bearing on the patient's condition, treat-
ment, and prognosis is also required under the subjective test." 6
The medical evidence must establish that the individual is an eld-
erly incompetent nursing-home" 7 patient with severe and perma-
nent mental and physical ailments and a life expectancy of one
year or less."'
Often, the subjective test cannot be met because there is inad-
equate proof to clearly establish the patient's intent either to ac-
cept or reject the life-sustaining treatment." 9 In such cases, "it is
naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as the
basis for substituted decision making."' 2 ° However, the possibility
Rev. Stat. § 449-800 (Supp. 1989); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11 (Supp. 1989);
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.510 (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5603(h) (Purdon Supp.
1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-1, 23-4 (1989); TEX, REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1
(Vernon Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3451 (1989).
114. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361-62, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985).
115. Id. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
116. Id. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231.
117. The court's rationale for narrowing its decision to nursing-home patients
is that these individuals are particularly vulnerable, often have no surviving im-
mediate family members, receive limited attention from physicians, and are resi-
dents of institutions which suffer from "peculiar industry-wide problems to which
hospitals are less prone." See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 374-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38. In a
trilogy of cases after Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the
analysis used in Conroy was limited to elderly incompetent patients with a lim-
ited life expectancy, and established alternative approaches for dealing with dif-
ferent types of patients. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987)(37-
year-old terminally ill woman's right to removal of respirator based on common
law and constitutional principles); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987)(65-year-old woman in persistent vegetative state had right to removal of
feeding tube based on the clear and convincing proof of her intent to have treat-
ment withdrawn); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987)(31-year-old wo-
man in persistent vegetative state entitled to have feeding tube removed because,
under Quinlan, family or close friends allowed to make substituted judgment for
patient).
118. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231.
119. Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231.
120. Id.
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of humane actions, which may involve the termination of life-sus-
taining treatment, should not be foreclosed for persons who never
clearly expressed their desires about such treatment, but who are
now suffering a prolonged and painful death. 2' The state's parens
patriae power permits it to authorize guardians to terminate treat-
ment if it would further the patient's best interest. 22 Both the lim-
ited-objective and the pure-objective tests involve a "best inter-
ests" standard.
2. The Limited-Objective Test
Under the limited-objective test, life-sustaining treatment may
be terminated from a patient in Claire Conroy's condition when
two conditions are met. First, there must be some trustworthy evi-
dence that the patient would have refused the treatment.2 3 Sec-
ond, the decision-maker must be satisfied that the burdens of the
patient's continued life with the treatment clearly outweigh the
benefits of that life for him.124 Thus, this test requires that there
be some evidence, though not of the formal nature required under
the subjective test, that the patient would have wanted the treat-
ment terminated and that the patient is suffering. 2 5
3. The Pure-Objective Test
When there is absolutely no evidence of the patient's desire to
have life-sustaining treatment terminated, the test simply focuses
on whether the patient is suffering.12  This pure-objective test,
however, requires a higher degree of suffering than the limited-ob-
jective test.'27 "The recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the
patient's life with the treatment should be such that the effect of
administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane. ' '1 28 It
must be emphasized that this test does not authorize decisions
based on assessments of the personal worth or social utility of the
patient's life, or the value of his life to others.'29 Thus, a quality of
121. Id.
122. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
123. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
1990]
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life assessment is impermissible.
4. Type of Treatment
The Conroy court rejected certain distinctions that had been
drawn by prior courts in right to die cases. For example, the court
refused to find controlling any distinction between hastening death
by terminating treatment and passively allowing a person to die of
a disease.13 ° The court also refused to distinguish withholding ver-
sus withdrawing life-sustaining treatment,"3 and ordinary versus
extraordinary forms of treatment. 132 In particular, the court saw no
significant distinction between the termination of artificial feedings
and the termination of other forms of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment.133 Each of the three Conroy tests primarily focuses on the
patient's wishes and the experience of pain - not the type of treat-
ment involved.131
The Conroy court acknowledged the emotional significance at-
tached to feeding, but saw a clear difference between artificial
feedings and bottle-feeding or spoon-feeding. 135 It noted that feed-
ing an incompetent patient through a tube is a "medical procedure
with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted by skilled
health-care providers to compensate for impaired physical func-
tioning. "136 In the court's view, feeding a patient by means of a
130. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233-34. The court characterized the distinction
as "one of limited use in a legal analysis of such a decision-making situation." Id.
at 369, 486 A.2d at 1234. The court emphasized that the distinction is "particu-
larly nebulous" in the context of decisions regarding the withholding or with-
drawal of artificial sustenance. Id. For example, the court asked whether a physi-
cian who discontinued tube feeding would be actively causing death by removing
the patient's primary source of nutrients, or merely passively allowing the pa-
tient's medical condition to take its natural course. Id.
131. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1234. The court stated that "whether necessary
treatment is withheld at the outset or withdrawn later on, the consequence-the
patient's death-is the same." Id. at 370, 486 A.2d at 1234. It then noted that
from a policy standpoint, it would be unwise to prohibit the termination of treat-
ment under circumstances in which the same treatment could have been permissi-
bly withheld since such a rule might encourage premature decisions to allow a
patient to die. Id.
132. Id. at 370, 486 A.2d at 1234. The court stated that the terms "ordinary"
and "extraordinary" have too many conflicting meanings to be useful in-determin-
ing whether treatment should be given. Id. at 371, 486 A.2d at 1236.
133. Id. at 372, 486 A.2d at 1236.
134. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233.
135. Id. at 372-73, 486 A.2d at 1236.
136. Id. at 373, 486 A.2d at 1236.
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nasogastric tube is equivalent to a patient breathing by means of a
respirator, since "both prolong life through mechanical means
when the body can no longer perform a vital bodily function on its
own. "137
Other jurisdictions faced with the nutrition and hydration
question have engaged in a similar analysis to conclude that such
treatment may be terminated. 3 8 Moreover, the United States Su-
preme Court in Cruzan implied that artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion is a type of life-sustaining medical intervention that may be
terminated in the appropriate circumstances. The Court held only
that a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in
proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and
hydration from a person in a persistent vegetative state.1 39 The
Cruzan court did not in any way distinguish nutrition and hydra-
tion from other forms of lifesaving medical treatment, and ex-
pressly stated that a competent person would hold a constitution-
ally protected right to refuse this particular type of treatment.' 0
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, quite
clearly indicated that artificial nutrition and hydration should be
classified with other mechanical life-prolonging medical proce-
dures. She stated that providing artificial sustenance implicates
concerns identical to those raised when the state attempts any
type of forced invasion into the body."' Explaining that
"[a]rtificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other
forms of medical treatment," Justice O'Connor provided a graphic,
step-by-step description of the procedures used by medical person-
nel to insert nasogastric and gastrostomy tubes." She then stated:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against
her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to de-
termine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects
anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medi-
cal treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water.' 3
137. Id.
138. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
139. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, U.S. , 110 S. Ct.
2841, 2854 (1990).
140. Id. at 2852.
141. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Thus, both the majority opinion, and in particular, the concurring
opinion of Justice O'Connor strongly indicate that if the Court
were squarely faced with the issue, it would characterize artificial
nutrition and hydration as a type of lifesaving medical treatment
which may be withdrawn from a patient who otherwise qualifies
under the state's law.
B. Justification For the Conroy Decision
A decision allowing the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration from an incompetent, severely debilitated elderly pa-
tient with no hope of recovery, but who is not terminal or comatose
as defined by state law, is both legally and ethically justified. Such
a decision is legally justified because it is based on well established
common law rights and because none of the countervailing state
interests sufficiently outweigh the patient's right to refuse such
treatment. 44 The state's interests do not overcome the patient's
right when the patient's death is no longer distant and life-sus-
taining medical procedures only serve to prolong the dying process.
Likewise, allowing the termination of treatment from the class
of elderly patients discussed herein is ethically justified when the
patient satisfies one of the three Conroy tests. Extending the right
to die to these patients is based on the belief that unnecessarily
prolonging the dying process when there is no hope of recovery is
degrading and incompatible with respect for human dignity.'45 It is
not based on the notion that a dying elderly patient's life is worth
less than the suffering of and burden on his family, or on arbitrary
quality of life judgments.146
If the standard set forth in Conroy is to be criticized at all,
such criticism should focus on the difficulty that patients- will
likely encounter in meeting one of the three tests. Undeniably, the
subjective test will apply to few patients, since unequivocal evi-
dence of a patient's desire to have life-sustaining treatment termi-
nated is only infrequently available. 47 However, the heightened fo-
144. See supra text accompanying notes 30-44.
145. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 339, 486 A.2d 1209, 1250 (1985)(Handler,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id.
147. The available data indicates that only nine percent of the adult popula-
tion executes living wills or formally addresses the issue of continuing with life-
prolonging medical intervention. Emanuel & Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A
New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 J.A.M.A. 3288 (1989).
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cus on right to die issues in recent years, coupled with the states'
wide acceptance of living wills, 14 8 should prompt a greater percent-
age of the population to formally document personal wishes with
regard to the termination of treatment. Formal documentation
should meet even the most stringent evidentiary requirements.' 9
.The majority of elderly incompetent patients are more likely
to fall into one of the remaining Conroy categories - those encom-
passed by the limited-objective and pure-objective tests. That is,
there will either be only informal evidence of their preferences re-
garding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, or more likely,
there will be no evidence available at all. In these circumstances,
particularly the latter, the focus will be on the patient's suffering.
Critics may argue that such a focus is too narrow - that the appli-
cation of these tests will not lead to a more humane, dignified and
decent end for patients because it is too difficult to prove that they
experience pain.
Yet, a standard which does not give determinative weight to
the element of personal pain when there is no clear evidence of the
patient's wishes creates intolerable risks for the elderly. Such'a
standard is likely to encourage familial abuse. First, it provides
family members the opportunity to succumb to the temptation of
receiving their share of the estate more quickly. Second, such a
standard allows families to easily relieve themselves of the tremen-
dous expense of hospital or nursing home care. It also risks hasten-
ing the death of a pain-free patient who would prefer to have the
life-sustaining procedures continued for as long as possible. As the
court in Conroy noted, "[w]hen evidence of a person's wishes is
equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, in favor of preserving life."' 5 °
CONCLUSION
Mary and Edward Smith's dilemma could be resolved in a ju-
risdiction applying the Conroy standard. Edward would most
likely meet the limited-objective test, since he had previously in.-
formally discussed his desire not to be kept alive by life-sustaining.
medical procedures, and since he appears to be experiencing a
great deal of pain.
Using the safeguards inherent in the three Conroy tests, those
jurisdictions that will eventually face the issue should extend the
148. See text accompanying notes 69-87.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
150. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 368, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985)
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right to die to elderly incompetent patients who retain a minimal
level of conscious activity. In determining if such a patient's treat-
ment may be terminated, the court should first look for clear evi-
dence of the patient's intent not to have life-sustaining medical
procedures continued, and should be bound by such evidence. In
the alternative, the court should apply a balancing test to deter-
mine the patient's best interests. Application of the Conroy stan-
dard preserves a patient's right to bodily self-determination, even
if he is incompetent at the time the decision to terminate treat-
ment must be made. Perhaps more importantly, it also serves the
important social goal of ensuring that the elderly incompetent are
allowed to die with dignity.
Cary C. Homes
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